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Abstract. In the landmark paper on the theoretical side of Polymer,
Ligatti and his co-authors have identified a new class of enforcement
mechanisms based on the notion of edit automata, that can transform
sequences and enforce more than simple safety properties.
We show that there is a gap between the edit automata that one can
possibly write (e.g. by Ligatti himself in his running example) and the
edit automata that are actually constructed according the theorems from
Ligatii’s IJIS paper and IC follow-up papers by Talhi et al. ”Ligatti’s
automata” are just a particular kind of edit automata.
Thus, we re-open a question which seemed to have received a definitive
answer: you have written your security enforcement mechanism (aka your
edit automata); does it really enforce the security policy you wanted?
Key words: Formal models for security, trust and reputation, Resource
and Access Control, Validation/Analysis tools and techniques
1 Introduction
The explosion of multi-player games, P2P applications, collaborative tools on
Web 2.0, corporate clients in service oriented architectures have changed the
usage models of the average computer: users demand to install more and more
applications from a variety of sources. Unfortunately, the full usage of those
applications is at odds with the current security model.
The first hurdle is certification. Certified application by trusted parties can
run with full powers while untrusted ones essentially without any powers. How-
ever, certification just says that the code is trusted rather than trustworthy
because the certificate has no semantics whatsoever. Will your apparently in-
nocuous application collect your private information and upload it to the remote
server [13]? Will your corporate client developed in out-sourcing dump your hard
disk in a shady country? You have no way to know.
Model carrying code [16] or Security-by-Contract [3] which claim that code
should come equipped with a security claims to be matched against the platform
policies could be a solution. However this will only be a solution for certified code.
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To deal with the untrusted code either .NET [10] or Java [6] can exploit
the mechanism of permissions. Permissions are assigned to enable execution of
potentially dangerous functionalities, such as starting various types of connec-
tions or accessing sensitive information. The drawback is that after assigning a
permission the user has very limited control over its usage. An application with
a permission to upload a video can then send hundreds of them invisibly for the
user (see the Blogs on UK Channel 4’s Video on Demand application). Condi-
tional permissions that allow and forbid use of the functionality depending on
such factors as the bandwidth or some previous actions of the application itself
are out of reach. The consequence is that either applications are sandboxed (and
thus can do almost nothing), or the user decided that they are trusted and then
they can do almost everything.
To overcome these drawbacks a number of authors have proposed to enforce
the compliance of the application to the user’s policies by execution monitoring.
This is the idea behind security automata [4, 7, 1, 14], safety control of Java
programs using temporal logic specs [8] and history based access control [9].
In order to provide enforcement of security policies at run time by monitoring
untrusted programs we want to know what kind of policies are enforceable and
what sorts of mechanisms can actually enforce them. In a landmark paper [2]
Bauer, Ligatti and Walker seemed to provide a definitive answer by presenting a
new hierarchy of enforcement mechanisms and classification of security policies
that are enforceable by these mechanisms.
Traditional security automata were essentially action observers, that stopped
the execution as soon as an illegal sequence of action was on the eve of being per-
formed. The new classification of enforcement mechanisms proposed by Ligatti
included truncation, insertion, suppression and edit automata which were con-
sidered as execution transformers rather than execution recognizers. The great
novelty of these kinds of automata was that they could transform the bad pro-
gram executions in such executions that satisfy the security policy.
These automata were then classified with respect to the properties they can
enforce: precisely and effectively enforceable properties. It is stated in [2] that
as precise enforcers, edit automata have the same power as truncation, sup-
pression and insertion automata. As for effective enforcement, it is said that
edit automata can insert and suppress actions by defining suppression-rewrite
and insertion-rewrite functions and thus can actually enforce more expressive
properties than simple safety properties. The proof of Theorem 8 in [2] pro-
vides us with a construction of an edit automaton that can effectively enforced
any (enforceable) property. Talhi et al. [17] have further refined the notion by
considering bounded version of enforceable properties.
1.1 Contribution of the Paper
If everything is settled why we need to write this paper? Everything started
when we tried to formally show “as an exercise” that the running example of
edit automaton from [2] provably enforces the security policy described in that
paper by applying the effective enforcement theorem from the very same paper.
Much to our dismay, we failed.
As a result of this failure we decided to plunge into a deeper investigation
and discovered that this was not for lack of will, patience or technique. Rather,
the impossibility of reconciling the running example of a paper with the theorem
on the very same paper is a consequence of a significant gap between the edit
automata that one can possibly write (e.g. by Ligatti himself in his running ex-
ample) and the edit automata that are actually constructed according Theorem
8 from [2] and Theorem 8 from [12]and the follow-up papers by Talhi et al. [17].
”Ligatti’s automata” are just a particular kind of edit automata. Figure 4 later
in the paper shows that we were trying to prove the equivalence of automata
belonging to different classes, even though they are the “same” according to [2].
The contribution of this paper is therefore manyfold:
– We show the difference between the running example from [2] and the edit
automata that are constructued according Thm. 8 in the very same paper.
– We introduce a more fine grained classification of edit automata introducing
the notion of Delayed Automata and related security properties and relation
between different notion of enforcement.
– We further explain the gap by showing that the particular automata that
are actually constructed according Thm. 8 from [2] are a particular form of
delayed automata that have an all-or-nothing behavior and that we named
Ligatti’s automata.
– We show that the construction from Talhi et al. [17] only applies to Ligatti’s
automata and therefore provide a more useful construction that is the inverse
of Talhi et al. [17] construction: namely from a policy specification expressed
as a Bu¨chi automaton we show how to construct a Ligatii’s automaton that
enforces it.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. At first we sketch the
difference between the edit automaton from the running example and Thm. 8
from [2] (§2). Then we present the basic notions of enforcement and introduce
a more fine grained classification of edit automata introducing the notion of
Delayed Automata (§3). Section 4 explains relation between different notions of
enforcement and types of edit automata. Finally we conclude with a discussion
of future and related works (§5).
2 The example revised
In this section we will use the very same example from of the simple market
system from [2].
Example 1. Market system 1
1 The example is taken from the [2], p.11
”To make our example more concrete, we will model a simple mar-
ket system with two main actions, take(n)and pay(n),which represent
acquisition of n apples and the corresponding payment. We let a range
over all the actions that might occur in the system (such as take, pay,
window-shop, browse, etc.) Our policy is that every time an agent takes
n apples it must pay for those apples. Payments may come before ac-
quisition or vice versa, and take(n); pay(n)is semantically equivalent
to pay(n);take(n). The edit automaton enforces the atomicity of this
transaction by emitting take(n);pay(n)only when the transaction com-
pletes. If payment is made first, the automaton allows clients to perform
other actions such as browse before committing (the take-pay trans-
action appears atomically after all such intermediary actions). On the
other hand, if apples are taken and not paid for immediately, we issue
a warning and abort the transaction. Consistency is ensured by remem-
bering the number of apples taken or the size of the prepayment in the
state of the machine. Once acquisition and payment occur, the sale is
final and there are no refunds (durability).”
In order to formally define the allowed and prohibited behavior described in
the market policy we present: 1) a predicate P̂ over sequences of executions; 2)
the expected output for every input sequence according the original example in
Table 1. In addition, in column ”Decision is finalized” we mark the sequences in
which the decision about the output can be finalized and unmark those, where
additional input is required to make a decision; in column ”Violation” we mark
the sequences, which violate the security policy and the pay(n) action does not
appear immediately after the take(n) action.
According to the example 1 if there is an action different from pay(n) af-
ter take(n) then the warning is in the output and we mark the sequence as
violation. Hence the sequences 3 and 6-12 are marked in the ”Violation” col-
umn and violate the policy P̂ . Let us explain the expected output from some
of these examples. The sequence 7 contains take(n) action and browse action
after it. Hence, the policy is violated and we expect the action take(n) be
suppressed and output the warning action instead. The user cannot take some
apples and browse after, but he can simply browse the apples without taking
them. Also pay(2);take(2) actions do not violate the policy. Therefore the out-
put is warning;browse;pay(2);take(2). In the same way we obtain the expected
output from the sequences 3, 6, 8-12.
In the sequences 13-15 the text of original example leaves opened a number
of interpretations. It is clear that good sequences must have a pair of take(n)
and pay(n) as the text implies, but it is not clear whether we allow interleaving
of pay(n) and pay(m). The text seems to imply that this is not possible so we
mark them as violations.
We say that the decision is made over the sequence if either a take-pay
transaction is completed (after the last pay(n) action there is a take(n) action)
or the transaction is violated (after take(n)action there is an action different
from pay(n)). But for instance in sequence 14 it is not clear whether the decision
Table 1. Sequences of actions for market policy
No. Sequence of actions σ Expected output P̂ (σ) Decision is Violation
finalized
1 take(1) · ×
2 pay(1) · ×
3 take(1);browse warning; browse × √ √
4 pay(1);browse browse ×
5 pay(1); take(1) pay(1);take(1)
√ √
6 take(1);browse;pay(2) warning;browse × √
7 take(1);browse;pay(2);take(2) warning;browse; × √ √
pay(2);take(2)
8 take(1);browse;pay(1) warning;browse × √
9 take(1);browse;pay(1);take(2) warning;browse × √
10 take(1);browse;pay(1);take(2); warning;browse; × √
browse warning;browse
11 take(1);browse;pay(1);take(2); warning;browse; × √
browse;pay(2) warning;browse
12 take(1); pay(2); take(2) pay(2);take(2) × √
13 pay(1);browse;pay(2) browse ×
14 pay(1);browse;pay(2);take(2) browse;pay(2); × √(?)
take(2)
15 pay(1);browse;pay(2);take(2); browse;pay(2); × √(?)
browse take(2);browse
is made because we don’t know if the pay(1) action should still be followed by
the take(1) action or it should be simply suppressed.
The edit automaton that, as authors of [2] say, effectively enforces the market
policy is shown in Fig. 1. But the definition of effective enforcement includes the
notion of property P̂ : the predicate over the sequences of actions and this
predicate is not given explicitly in [2]. That is why following the example in
English we are presenting the Table 1 as a market policy. Assuming that our
presentation of the policy corresponds to the example 1 the given edit automaton
[2] should effectively enforces the policy in Table 1.
According to the Theorem 8 of [2], any property P̂ can be effectively enforced
by some edit automaton.
For the sake of simplicity we build the edit automaton only partly (see Fig.
2) and the possible actions are Σ = take(1), take(2), pay(1), pay(2), browse.
Here we use a browse action just to present some other actions that the user can
do after paying before taking the apples. According to the text of the example,
an action warning is considered to be an output action in infinite-state edit
automaton presented by the authors of [2] (see Fig. 1). On the other hand, the
warning action is not in the set of possible input actions and hence it cannot
appear in the output of automaton constructed following the algorithm given as
a proof of Theorem 8 [2].
Fig. 1. An edit automaton that ”effectively” enforces the market policy [2].
As the cardinality of input language is five (|Σ| = 5), every state will have
five outcoming arcs for all possible actions. We will present here only some of
them in order to let the reader see the output sequences for particular input
sequences. Constructed automaton is shown in Fig. 2.
As proposed in [2] the state of automaton q ∈ Σ∗ × Σ∗ × {+,−} (the se-
quence of actions seen so far, the actions seen but not emitted, and + (-) to
indicate that the automaton must not (must) suppress the current action, the
notation of Σ∗ denotes the set of all finite-length sequences of actions on a
system with action set Σ). For example, let us have a look at the the finite in-
put sequence pay(1);browse;pay(2);take(2);browse. The correspondent trace
is q0, q1, q3, q5, q8, q11:
- The initial state q0 = 〈·, ·,+〉.
- When the action pay(1) is proceeding in state q0, it is suppressed because
¬P̂ (pay(1)), so the next state is q1 = 〈pay(1), pay(1),+〉.
- At the next step the action browse is proceeding, since ¬P̂ (pay(1); browse),
this action is also suppressed and next state is q3 = 〈pay(1); browse, pay(1);
browse,+〉.
- At every step the action is suppressed according to the predicate P̂ . The next
state is q5 = 〈pay(1); browse; pay(2), pay(1); browse; pay(2), +〉.
- q8 = 〈pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2), pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2),+〉.
- q11 = 〈pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2); browse, pay(1); browse; pay(2);
take(2); browse, +〉
After construction we discovered that for the same input edit automaton that
effectively enforces P̂ (Fig. 1) and the one constructed by the proof of Theorem
8 (some edit automaton that effectively enforces P̂ ) produce different output.
Let us show in Table 2 some cases when the constructed by Theorem 8 edit
automaton produces ”better” or more expected output and some other cases
when the edit automaton from Fig.1 [2] produces ”better” output.
Fig. 2. Constructed edit automaton for the market problem (Ex.1)
In the lines 2-5 of the run, both Edit Automata produce the output that was
was not expected by the user according to the Table 1. Only in line 1, when the
input sequence is legal, the output is expected.
Let us consider the sequence 2 take(1); browse; pay(1); take(2); browse;
pay(2). The expected output is warning; browse; warning; browse because the
first two actions take(1); browse are not legal and produce warning (the pay
action must always go immediately after the take action), while browse action is
legal by itself, so it can be in output sequence. Then the pay(1) action is simply
supposed to be suppressed, then take(2); browse; pay(2) part of the sequence
should be transformed into warning;browse for the same reason. Instead, the
sequence is transformed into warning;browse by the EA presented in [2]. This
output is not expected by the user. The constructed EA outputs the empty
sequence which is also not expected.
The sequence 5 pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2); browse is supposed to be
transformed into browse; pay(2); take(2); browse because the action pay(1)
without take(1) after it cannot be performed. Instead, the EA from [2] outputs
only browse; warning sequence and the constructed EA transforms it into the
empty sequence. So in this case both automata do not produce the expected
output.
The sequence 1 is transformed by both automata as expected (in our market
example policy take(1); pay(1) is semantically equivalent to pay(1); take(1)).
After constructing EA following the algorithm and the examples presented in
Table 2. Difference in output for edit automata
No. Input Output
EA from Fig.1 [2] Constructed EA
by Thm.8 [2]
1 pay(1); take(1) take(1);pay(1) pay(1);take(1)
2 take(1); browse; pay(1); warning;browse ·
take(2); browse; pay(2)
3 take(1); pay(2); take(2) warning ·
4 take(1); browse; pay(2); take(2) warning;take(2); pay(2) ·
5 pay(1); browse; pay(2); take(2); browse browse; warning ·
Fig. 3. Relation between input and output for edit automaton from Fig.1 [2] and edit
automaton constructed by Thm.8 [2]
Table 2 we found out that the transformed sequences of actions are not always the
ones expected from the EA. So the question arises: Why the output is predictable
in some cases and unpredictable in the others? The answer to this question is:
1. Both EA produce the expected output when the input sequence is legal
(sequence 1 in the example)
2. The edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 [2] is a
very particular kind of the edit automaton.
When the sequence is illegal the output of both edit automata is unexpected.
Further we will call illegal sequences as ”bad” traces or ”bad” sequences. In this
paper we are going to discover the dependence between ”bad” input sequences
and expected output, and explain the anomaly of unexpected outputs. We will
also analyze different particular types of edit automaton and reveal the type
of edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 and type of
edit automaton from Fig.1 [2]. For example, all the theorems referring to edit
automata in [17] are about that particular kind of automaton that is constructed
following the proof of Theorem 8 [2].
In Fig.3 we show the relation between input and output for edit automaton
from Fig.1 [2] and edit automata constructed by Thm.8 [2] with respect to
the ”good” and ”bad” traces. The main feature of their behavior is that if the
sequence is ”bad” constructed edit automaton by Thm.8 [2] outputs only the
longest valid prefix: so either outputs some valid sequence (ex.1 in Tab.2) or
suppresses all the sequence (ex.2-5 in Tab.2). On the other hand, edit automaton
from Fig.1 [2] always outputs some ”good” sequence of actions even if the longest
valid prefix is empty sequence (ex.2-5 in Tab.2).
3 Basic Notions
Similarly to [2] we specify the system at a high level of abstraction, where the set
Σ is the set of program actions; the set of all finite sequences over Σ is denoted
by Σ∗ similarly the set of all infinite sequences is Σω and the set Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪
Σω is a set of all finite and infinite executions. Execution σ is a finite sequence
of actions a1, a2, ..., an. In scope of this paper we assume only finite executions
leaving infinite sequences of actions to be considered in future work.
With · we denote an empty execution. The notation σ[i] is used to denote the
i -th action in the sequence (begin counting at 0). The notation σ[..i] denotes the
subsequence of σ involving the actions σ[0] through σ[i], and σ[i + 1..] denotes
the subsequence of σ involving all other actions. We use the notation τ ;σ to
denote the concatenation of two sequences.
Let us present here two different approaches to present the security policy.
1. A security policy in [2] is a predicate P̂ on all possible finite sequences of
executions, but in this case the edit automaton which effectively enforces
this policy is not constructive: following the proof of Thm.8 the only infinite
states automaton can be constructed.
2. A security policy P specifying the desired behavior of the system can be rep-
resented as deterministic Bu¨chi Automaton, in this case the edit automaton
with finite number of states can be constructed for the given security policy
3.1 Generic definition of Edit Automata and its’ particular types
As showed in Section 2 the constructed edit automaton following the algorithm
in [2] and edit automaton presented in [2] are different. We give the original
definition of edit automata from [2]:
An Edit Automaton E is described by a 5-tuple of the form 〈Q, q0, δ, γ, ω〉
with respect to some system with actions set Σ. Q specifies possible states, and
q0 is the initial state. The partial function δ : (Σ×Q)→ Q specifies the transition
function; the partial function ω : (Σ ×Q) → {−,+} has the same domain as δ
and indicates whether or not the action is to be suppressed (-) or emitted(+);
the partial function γ is an insertion function, γ : (Σ×Q)→ Σ∗×Q. The partial
functions δ and γ have disjoint domains.
(σ, q) τ−→ E(σ′, q′) (1)
(σ, q) a−→ E(σ′, q′) if σ = a;σ′ ∧ δ(a, q) = q′ ∧ ω(a, q) = + (2)
(σ, q) ·−→ E(σ′, q′) if σ = a;σ′ ∧ δ(a, q) = q′ ∧ ω(a, q) = − (3)
(σ, q) τ−→ E(σ, q′) if σ = a;σ′ ∧ γ(a, q) = τ ; q′ (4)
(σ, q) ·−→ E(·, q) otherwise (5)
Assuming that the function γ always inserts all necessary actions that have
to appear before the a action, we can rewrite the case of insertion as statement
(4) and then statement (2). We consider that after inserting some actions τ at
the next step the automaton will accept the current action a (if inserting τ ; a
makes the output illegal then one can simply suppress a without inserting τ).
Hence, the equation (4) can be represented as follows:
(σ, q)
τ ;a−→ E(σ′, q′) if σ = a;σ′ ∧ γ(a, q) = τ ; q′ (6)
In this way, the sequences σ and σ′ are not relevant in the definition of
transitions. Loosely speaking this was a Mealy-Moore transformation. In order
to give a formal definition in our notations, we will use the σS sequence to define
the sequence that was read but is not in the output yet.
Definition 1 (Edit Automata (EA)). An Edit Automaton E is a 5-tuple
of the form 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 with respect to some system with actions set Σ. Q
specifies possible states, and q0 is the initial state. The partial function δ : (Σ ×
Q) → Q specifies the transition function; the partial function γo : (Σ∗ × Q) →
Σ∗ defines the output of the transition according to the current state and the
sequence of actions that is read but not in the output yet; the partial function
γk : (Σ∗ ×Q) → Σ∗ defined the sequence that will be kept after committing the
transition.
(q, σS)
γo(q,σS ;a)−→ E(q′, γk(q, σS ; a)) (7)
Proposition 1. The definition of edit automaton A = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉 has the
same expressive power of the original definition AL = 〈Q, q0, δ, γL, ωL〉 [2].
Proof. We simply define the keep function as γk = · and the output function as
follows:
γo(q, σS ; a) =

a if δL(q, a) = q′ ∧ ωL(q, a) = +,
· if δL(q, a) = q′ ∧ ωL(q, a) = −,
τ ; a if γL(a; q) = τ ; q′,
· otherwise.
(8)
Similarly, for the suppression automaton we define γk(q, σS ; a) = · and
γo(q, σS ; a) =

a if δL(q, a) = q′ ∧ ωL(q, a) = +,
· if δL(q, a) = q′ ∧ ωL(q, a) = −,
· otherwise.
(9)
For the insertion automaton γk(q, σS ; a) = · and
γo(q, σS ; a) =

a if δL(q, a) = q′,
τ ; a if γL(a; q) = τ ; q′,
· otherwise.
(10)

Let us now give a deeper look at the automaton constructed according the
proof of Theorem 8 [2]. In this construction at every state the automaton has
emitted the sequence σ′, and σ′ is the longest valid prefix of the input sequence σ.
Indeed, Table 2 shows that this statement holds for EA constructed by Theorem
8 and it doesn’t hold for EA from Fig. 1 [2]. Therefore, in order to understand
what kind of edit automaton is in Fig. 1 we need to give a formal definition of
this kind of automaton. At every step, this automaton outputs some valid prefix
only when the sequences can become valid again in the future (e.g. for the se-
quence take(1);pay(1);take(2) after reading take(1);pay(1) the automaton
will output these actions, and after reading the take(2) action it will still out-
put the valid prefix take(1);pay(1)). And it outputs some corrected sequence
(current valid prefix and some other sequence) if the sequence cannot become
valid in the future(in example 2 of Table 2 after reading take(1);browse actions
the automaton outputs another action warning).
This corresponds to the following intuition:
Remark 1. The automaton Thm.8 in [2] just delays the appearance of input
actions until the input has built up a correct sequence again.
Formally, we propose a notion of wider class of such automata called Delayed
Automata. They simply output some prefix of the input. These class will be
the container of other less trivial cases when the property P̂ will be called into
account.
Definition 2 (Delayed Automata). Delayed automaton A is an edit automa-
ton that is described by a 5-tuple of the form A = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉, where the
transition is defined as in equation (7) with the restriction transition is defined
as follows:
(q, σS)
γo(q,σS ;a)−→ E(q′, γk(q, σS ; a))
and the restriction that it always outputs a prefix of the input:
σS ; a = γo(q, σS ; a); γk(q, σS ; a) (11)
In order to give a formal definition of the automata from Theorem 8 [2]
for any property P̂ we present also a wider class of automata called All-Or-
Nothing Automata. These automata always output a prefix of the input (hence
it is a particular kind of the Delayed Automata). Moreover, at every step of the
transition either it outputs all suspended inputs or suppresses the current action.
Definition 3 (All-Or-Nothing Automata). All-Or-Nothing automaton A is
an edit automaton described by a 5-tuple of the form A = 〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉, where
the transition relation is defined as in equation (7) with the following restrictions:
– This automaton outputs a prefix of the input: the statement (11) holds.
– At every step of the transition either it outputs all the suspended sequence of
actions or suppresses the current action:
γo(q, σS ; a) =
{
σS ; a
· (12)
The next step is the refinement of this class towards what we call Ligatti Au-
tomata for P̂ . These automata always output a prefix of the input (hence it
is a particular kind of the Delayed Automata) and they are particular kind of
All-Or-Nothing automata. Moreover, they output the longest valid prefix. The
definition of Ligatti Automaton for property P̂ given below was made according
to the construction of edit automaton given in the proof of Theroem 8 [2].
Definition 4 (Ligatti Automata for property P̂ ). Ligatti automaton E
for property P̂ is an edit automaton described by a 5-tuple of the form E =
〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉, where the set of states Q = Σ∗ (every state contains the already
accepted sequence σ) and the transition relation is defined in similar way as in
equation (7):
(σ, σS)
γo(σ,σS ;a)−→ E(σ; γo(σ, σS ; a), γk(σ, σS ; a)) (13)
With the following restrictions:
– The automaton outputs a prefix of the input(the statement (11) holds):
σS ; a = γo(σ, σS ; a); γk(σ, σS ; a)
– Either it outputs all the suspended sequence of actions or suppress the current
action (the statement (12) holds):
γo(σ, σS ; a) =
{
σS ; a
·
– Output is a valid prefix of the input:
P̂ (σ; γo(σ, σS ; a) (14)
– If the current sequence is valid then it outputs all the sequence:
If P̂ (σ;σS ; a) then γo(σ, σS ; a) = σS ; a. (15)
At every state the Ligatti automaton for property P̂ keeps the sequence σ
that was read till the current moment in order to decide whether P̂ (σ;σS ; a)
holds. That explains why Q= Σ∗. In our definition the Ligatti Automaton for
property P̂ is obviously a particular kind of Edit Automaton. We will show that
this statement holds in the original definition as well.
Proposition 2. The Ligatti Automaton for property P̂ is an Edit Automaton
according Ligatti’s own Definition.
Proof. Indeed, given a property P̂ and input sequence σ let us assume that at the
current step a = σ[i]. Then let us define the rewrite functions ω and γ for Edit
Automaton such that Ligatti Automaton for property P̂ is an Edit Automaton.
In order to show this we need to keep in the state the sequence of actions σA
that was already emitted and sequence of actions σS that was suppressed in
every state: q = 〈σA, σS〉. This is exactly what is done in construction in proof
of Theorem 8 [2]. Then we just use the following rewrite functions.
– ω(a, q) = + if P̂ (σ[..i]) ∧ σS = ·;
ω(a, q) = − if ¬P̂ (σ[..i]) for suppression, and
– γ(a, q) = σS , q′ ∧ q′ = 〈σ[..i]; ·〉 if P̂ (σ[..i]) ∧ σS 6= · for insertion.

Let us now show the inverse of this claim: the edit automaton constructed
following the proof of Theorem 8 [2] is a Ligatti Automaton for property P̂ .
Proposition 3. The Edit automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem
8 in [2] for property P̂ is a Ligatti Automaton for P̂ .
Proof. Consider processing the action a, σ is input so far, σS is a suppressed
sequence of actions. Let us have a look at two main steps of construction:
– if ¬P̂ (σ; a) then suppress a , σ′S = σS ; a.
– if P̂ (σ; a) then insert σS ; a.
Since at every step the output is · or σS ; a then the automaton obeys the prop-
erty (12) and also it always outputs prefix of the input, hence statement (11)
holds as well. Constructed automaton outputs the sequence only if it is valid,
hence statement (14) holds. It outputs all the suppressed actions if the sequence
becomes valid, therefore statement (15) holds as well. Since all the conditions of
Ligatti Automaton for P̂ are satisfied, we conclude that automaton constructed
following the proof of Theorem 8 in [2] for property P̂ is Ligatti Automaton for
P̂ 
In a nutshell, the difference between generic Edit Automata and Ligatti Au-
tomata for property P̂ is the following: generic Edit Automata suppress and
insert arbitrary actions according to the given rewriting functions ω and γ while
Ligatti Automata for property P̂ can only insert those actions that were read be-
fore; suppressed actions either will be inserted when the input sequence becomes
valid or all subsequent actions will be suppressed. Thus the Ligatti Automata
for property P̂ outputs the longest valid prefix of the input sequence.
Since the automaton constructed following the proof of Theorem 8 [2] is a
Ligatti Automaton for property P̂ while the automaton given in [2] (Fig.1) is a
generic Edit Automaton, the difference between their behaviors is not clear.
Still, the automaton of Fig.1 is not a completely arbitrary edit automaton
and we propose a notion of Delayed Automaton for property P̂ . If the sequence
is valid it outputs a valid prefix of the input, otherwise it can output some valid
sequence (i.e. a fixing of the input).
Definition 5 (Delayed Automata for property P̂ ). Delayed automaton A
for P̂ is an edit automaton that is described by a 5-tuple of the form A =
〈Q, q0, δ, γo, γk〉, where the transition is defined in the same way as in equation
(7) with the following restrictions:
If P̂ (σ;σS ; a) then
– Output is a prefix of the input (the statement (11) holds) and
– Output is a valid prefix of the input (the statement (14) holds).
Later in Figure 4 we will pictorially describe the situation. However, in order
to explain more relations present in that picture we need first to define the notion
of enforcement in the next section.
4 Types of enforcement
The following two main principles to compare different enforcement mechanisms
were given in [2]:
Definition 6 (Soundness). An enforcement mechanism must ensure that all
observable outputs obey the property in question.
Definition 7 (Transparency). An enforcement mechanism must preserve the
semantics of executions that already obey the property in question.
The notion of precise enforcement by [2] obeys both Soundness and Trans-
parency properties. According to that definition, the automaton in question out-
puts program actions in lock-step with the target program’s action stream if the
action stream σ is valid. Suppose that at the current moment the automaton
reads i-th action in the sequence, and the sequence σ[..i+ 1] is not valid. Then
the automaton will not output any other actions.
In order to formalize such a behavior when the automaton can suppress some
actions and then later insert it when it turns out that the sequence is legal, we
present the notion of Delayed precise enforcement.
Definition 8 (Delayed Precise Enforcement). An Edit Automaton A with
starting state q0 delayed precisely enforces a property P̂ on the system with
action set Σ iff ∀σ ∈ Σ∗ ∃q′ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗.
1. (σ, q0)
σ′−→ A(·, q′),
2. P̂ (σ′), and
3. P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′ ∧ ∀i ∃j. j ≤ i ∃q∗. (σ, q0) σ[..j]−→ A(σ[i+ 1..], q∗).
There is another notion of enforcement called ”effective=enforcement” [12],
which also obeys the properties of soundness and transparency.
Definition 9 (Effective= Enforcement). An automaton A with starting state
q0 effectively= enforces a property P̂on the system with action set Σ iff ∀σ ∈
Σ∗ ∃q′ ∃σ′ ∈ Σ∗.
1. (σ, q0)
σ′−→ A(·, q′),
2. P̂ (σ′), and
3. P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′
Let us show the relation between delayed precise enforcement and effective=en-
forcement.
Theorem 1. If the edit automaton A delayed precisely enforces a property P̂
then it effectively=enforces a property P̂ .
Proof. Since the 1st and 2nd conditions are equal for delayed precise enforcement
and effective enforcement, we have to prove that if the 3d condition of delayed
precise enforcement holds then the 3d condition of effective=enforcement holds
as well, hence we have to prove that if (16) then (17):
P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′ ∧ ∀i ∃j. j ≤ i ∃q∗. (σ, q0) σ[..j]−→ A(σ[i+ 1..], q∗) (16)
P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′ (17)
We can see that formula (16) is a strengthening of (17). 
Let us come back to Example 1. It is said in [2] that the given edit automaton
(Fig. 1), effectively enforces the market policy. But since the market policy is
given only in natural language, stating that ”An edit automata effectively en-
forces the market policy” is stretching the definition a bit as the market policy
is not defined: the predicate P̂ is not given.
Let us show in Fig. 4 all edit automata and its’ particular subclasses presented
above. The following theorems show the relation between different types of edit
automata.
Proposition 4. If an edit automaton A is a Delayed Automaton then it is not
necessary that A is a Delayed Automaton for property P̂ .
Proof. By σ we denote an input sequence of the automaton and σ′ is an output
sequence. A Delayed automaton A obeys only one property: it always outputs
prefix of the input (statement (11) holds). Hence, even if the overall input se-
quence σ is valid A can output an invalid prefix of the input (¬P̂ (σ′)), while
Delayed Automaton for property P̂ will always output a valid prefix (statement
(14)). 
Proposition 5. If an edit automaton A is a Delayed Automaton for property
P̂ then it is not necessary that A is a Delayed Automaton.
Fig. 4. The classes of Edit Automata.
Proof. In case of invalid input sequence Delayed Automaton for property P̂ can
output another sequence which is not necessarily a prefix of the input, while
Delayed Automaton will always output a prefix of the input (item 11). 
From the theorems 4 and 5 we can conclude that classes of Delayed Automata
and Delayed Automata for P̂ have some common subclass but none of them
include the other.
Theorem 2. If edit automaton A effectively=enforces property P̂ then A is a
Delayed Automaton for property P̂ and it is not necessary that A is a Delayed
Automaton.
Proof. By σ we denote an input sequence of the automaton and σ′ is an out-
put sequence. The automaton A that effectively=enforces P̂ obeys the following
properties: a) P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′; b) P̂ (σ′). Hence it always outputs the valid prefix
of the input (the whole sequence in this case), so automaton A is a Delayed
Automaton for P̂ according to its’ definition.
In case of invalid input, automaton A will output some valid sequence (ac-
cording to the property b) of effective enforcement) which is not necessary prefix
of the input. Therefore it is not necessarily Delayed Automaton. 
Proposition 6. If edit automaton A is a Delayed Automaton for property P̂
then it is not necessary that A effectively=enforces property P̂ .
Proof. By σ we denote an input sequence of the automaton and σ′ is an output
sequence. In case of a valid input the Delayed Automaton for P̂ will output
some valid prefix of the input and not necessary the whole input, hence the
property of effective=enforcement P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′ will not hold. 
From Theorem 2 and Proposition 6 we conclude that the class of edit au-
tomata that effectively=enforces property P̂ is a particular class of Delayed Au-
tomata for P̂ and is not a proper subset of Delayed Automata.
Theorem 1 shows that edit automata that delayed precisely enforce property
P̂ are a particular type of edit automata that effectively=enforce P̂ . The key
point is that in the definition of delayed precise enforcement it is left open how
illegal input is transformed.
Let us have a look at the 2d and 3d conditions of precise enforcement:
P̂ (σ′)
P̂ (σ)⇒ ∀i ∃q′′. (σ, q0) σ[..i]−→ A(σ[i+ 1..], q′′)
These conditions mean that the automaton will produce the output in a
step-by-step fashion with the monitored action stream and will output only a
valid prefix. As soon as input sequence becomes illegal, the automaton will stop
outputting. Therefore, in case of precise enforcement for illegal input, it will
output some valid prefix σ′ = σ[..k] such that ∀i. i ≤ k. P̂ (σ[..i])∧¬P̂ (σ[..k+1]).
In case of delayed precise enforcement for illegal input the output will be some
valid prefix σ′ = σ[..k] such that ∀i. i ≤ k. P̂ (σ[..i]).
Theorem 3. An edit automaton A delayed precisely enforces property P̂ if
and only if A is Delayed Automaton, A is Delayed Automaton for P̂ and it
effectively=enforces property P̂ .
Proof. Similarly to definitions of delayed precise enforcement and effective=en-
forcement by σ we denote an input sequence of the automaton and σ′ is an
output sequence. (If Direction). If edit automaton A delayed precisely enforces
property P̂ then it always outputs a prefix of the input, therefore statement (11)
holds and A is Delayed Automaton. Since the 2nd condition of delayed precise
enforcement states that P̂ (σ′) then the statement (14) of Delayed Automaton
for P̂ holds, therefore A is Delayed Automaton for P̂ . According to theorem 1,
since A delayed precisely enforces P̂ it also effectively=enforces P̂ .
(Only-if direction). If A is Delayed Automaton, A is Delayed Automaton for P̂
and it effectively=enforces property P̂ then it always outputs some valid pre-
fix of the input (property (11) of Delayed Automaton and property P̂ (σ′) of
effective=enforcement) and in case of valid input it outputs all the input sequence
(property P̂ (σ)⇒ σ = σ′ of effective=enforcement). Hence, the 2nd property of
delayed precise enforcement holds: P̂ (σ′) . The 3d property holds as well because
in this case at every step Delayed Automaton for P̂ outputs some valid prefix and
finally it outputs the input sequence because of effective=enforcement. Hence A
delayed precisely enforces P̂ . 
Proposition 7. Delayed automaton A that delayed precisely enforces property
P̂ is not necessarily a Ligatti Automaton for P̂ .
Proof. In case of illegal input sequences a Delayed Automaton will output some
prefix and since it delayed precisely enforces property P̂ it will output some (not
necessarily the longest one) valid prefix of the input. While Ligatti Automaton
for P̂ will always output only the longest valid prefix of input. Therefore, an
automaton A may not be a Ligatti Automaton for P̂ . 
Proposition 8. All-Or-Nothing automaton A is a Delayed Automaton but not
necessarily Delayed Automaton for property P̂ .
Proof. Since statement (11) holds for All-Or-Nothing automaton A then A is a
Delayed Automaton. A is not a Delayed Automaton for P̂ because it can output
some prefix of the input such that ¬P̂ (σ′). 
Theorem 4. All-Or-Nothing automaton A delayed precisely enforces property
P̂ if and only if A is a Ligatti Automaton for property P̂ .
Proof. (If Direction). If automaton A is All-Or-Nothing automaton then the
statement (12) holds. Since A delayed precisely enforces property P̂ then ac-
cording to the theorem 3: a) A is a Delayed Automaton hence the statement
(11) holds; b) A is Delayed Automaton for P̂ therefore statement (14) holds; c)
A is All-Or-Nothing automaton that effectively=enforces P̂ hence at every step
it outputs all suspended sequence or suppress the action (statement (11))and
and it always outputs the input sequence σ if P̂ (σ). Therefore in case of valid
input (P̂ (σ)) the output is equal to the input, so statement (15) holds as well.
We have proved that A obeys all the conditions in the definition of Ligatti Au-
tomaton for P̂ .
(Only-if direction). If A is Ligatti Automaton for P̂ then
– It obeys the property (12) hence A is All-Or-Nothing Automaton;
– It obeys the property (11) hence A is Delayed Automaton;
– It obeys the property (14) hence A is Delayed Automaton for P̂ ;
– It obeys the property (15) hence A always outputs input sequence in case
of valid input and the longest valid prefix in case of illegal input, hence A
effectively=enforces P̂ .
Therefore since A is Delayed Automaton, A is Delayed Automaton for P̂ and
it effectively=enforces P̂ then it delayed precisely enforces P̂ according to the
theorem 3. 
Now we will define type of edit automaton constructed following the proof
of Theorem 8 in [2] for property P̂ and type of edit automaton presented by the
authors in [2] (Fig.1).
As the proposition 3 states, edit automaton constructed following the proof
of Theorem 8 in [2] for property P̂ is a Ligatti Automaton for P̂ . The edit
automaton given in Fig.1 [2] is an edit automaton that effectively=enforces P̂ :
the 2d condition of effective=enforcement is fulfilled (automaton always outputs
the valid sequence) and the 3d condition is valid because in case of valid input it
always outputs all the sequence. The edit automaton given in Fig.1 [2] is not a
Delayed Automaton because it does not always output some prefix of the input
(see examples 2-5 in Tab.2)
Therefore we can conclude that both automata from Theorem 8 [2] and from
Fig.1 [2] are edit automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ . But when one
wants to construct such an automaton and follows the proof of Theorem 8 [2],
he obtains Ligatti Automaton for P̂ that delayed precisely enforces P̂ .
5 Related work and Conclusions
Schneider [15] was the first to introduce the notion of enforceable security poli-
cies. The follow-up work by Hamlen et al. [7] fixed a number of errors and charac-
terized more precisely the notion of policies enforceable by execution monitoring
by security automata, and identifying enforceable policies as a subset of safety
properties. They also analyzed the properties that can be enforced by static
analysis and program rewriting. This taxonomy leads to a more accurate char-
acterization of enforceable security policies. Jay Ligatti, Lujo Bauer, and David
Walker [2] have introduced edit automata; a more detailed framework for reason-
ing about execution monitoring mechanisms. As we already said, in Schneider’s
view execution monitors are just sequence recognizers while Ligatti et al. view
execution monitors as sequence transformers. Having the power of modifying
program actions at run time, edit automata are provably more powerful than
security automata [11].
Fong [5] provided a fine-grained, information-based characterization of en-
forceable policies. In order to represent constraints on information available to
execution monitors, he used abstraction functions over sequences of monitored
programs and defined a lattice on the space of all congruence relations over ac-
tion sequences aimed at comparing classes of EM-enforceable security policies.
Still his policies are limited to safety properties over finite executions.
In case when security policy is represented by predicate P̂ over set of finite
executions we can conclude that both automata from Theorem 8 [2] and from
Fig.1 [2] are edit automata that effectively=enforce property P̂ . But when one
wants to construct such an automaton and follows the proof of Theorem 8 [2],
he obtains a Ligatti Automaton for P̂ that delayed precisely enforces P̂ . If the
security policy is represented as Bu¨chi Automaton AEM , the edit automaton
that effectively=enforces this policy can be constructed and in this case AEM is
also a Ligatti automaton for P̂ that delayed precisely enforces P̂ .
In summary we have shown that the difference between the running example
from [2] and the edit automata that are constructued according Thm. 8 in the
very same paper is due to a deeper theoretical difference. In order to understand
this difference we have introduced a more fine grained classification of edit au-
tomata introducing the notion of Delayed Automata. The particular automata
that are actually constructed according Thm 8 from [2] are a particular form
of delayed automata that have an all-or-nothing behavior and that we named
Ligatti’s automata in honor of their inventor.
Hence, the construction from Talhi et al. [17] only applies to Ligatti’s au-
tomata. Given a Ligatti automaton they can extract the Bu¨chi automaton that
represent the policy effectively enforced by the Ligatti automaton. What happens
if the automaton is not a Ligatti automaton? For example for Fig.1? Proposition
6.24 [17] simply does not apply.
What remains to be done? Our results shows that the edit automaton that
you can actually write (eg by using Polymer) does not necessarily correspond
to the theoretical construction that provably guarantees that your automaton
enforce your policy.
So we fully re-open the most intriguing question that the stream of papers
on execution monitors seemed to have closed: you have written your security
enforcement mechanism (aka your edit automata); how do you know that it really
enforces the security policy you specified?
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